Measles Vaccination

In the past month, the Charedi community in Israel experienced two tragic losses when young, unvaccinated infants died from measles infections. Unfortunately, a troubling attitude has emerged in recent years that downplays the importance of vaccination. Despite the exceptional safety of routine immunization, backed by decades of experience and proven efficacy in eradicating some of the most dangerous infectious diseases that once claimed countless lives, vaccine hesitancy continues to spread. These preventable deaths serve as a stark reminder of the danger of measles, particularly among vulnerable populations.

Undoubtedly, we must thank Hashem for the blessings of our modern world, where we no longer fear the deadly diseases that devastated previous generations. When illness does strike, modern medicine offers remarkable treatments – antibiotics and antiviral medications – that can save lives. Diseases that once claimed the lives of many infants and children, affecting entire families and communities, can now be prevented through vaccination or treated effectively when they occur. This medical progress is a testament to Hashem’s mercy and benevolence.

This emphasis is particularly important because decades of vaccination success and the near-eradication of devastating diseases like measles and polio have led some individuals and groups to refuse vaccination for their children. As we will outline below, this behavior is medically unjustified and irresponsible – violating both the parental duty to protect their children and the obligation to guard the broader community from harm. Vaccine refusal endangers not only their own children but also threatens the entire community by weakening herd immunity and increasing transmission risks for everyone, especially the most vulnerable.

The responsibility to prevent and distance from danger is a Mitzva that is strictly forbidden to neglect. The Rambam rules in Hilchot Rotze’ach (11:4):

Whether it be a roof, or any object that poses a danger, over which a person might stumble and die – for example, if a person has a pit or well in his courtyard, whether it contains water or not – he is obligated to build a protective wall at least ten Tefachim high around it, or to cover it, so that no one will fall into it and die. Similarly, for any obstacle that may be a cause of mortal danger, there is a Mitzva to remove it, to guard against it, and to be exceedingly careful regarding it, as it is said (Devarim 4:9): “Take heed to yourself and guard your life.” And if he does not remove it, but leaves hazards that can cause danger, he nullifies a Mitzva and transgresses “Do not place blood [in your house].”

In other words, there is a twofold obligation whenever a hazard exists: to distance oneself and exercise caution, and to eliminate the hazard itself. We derive this from the Mitzva of building a Ma’akeh (guardrail), where simply posting a guard at the roof’s entrance to warn people away from danger is insufficient. Instead, one must remove the threat entirely by constructing a proper guardrail.

The same is true in our case; a person may not rely on the idea that a particular diet or other unvalidated measures will protect his children from disease. Rather, it is a Mitzva to remove the actual source of danger. The only effective way to do this is by ensuring that everyone is properly vaccinated.

Opponents argue that vaccinations carry risks, suggesting that they may cause developmental disorders or other illnesses. They contend that we should not attempt to prevent a potential future disease if doing so exposes the child to another danger.

HaGaon Rav Asher Weiss Shlit”a dismisses this claim entirely. Well-designed studies involving hundreds of millions of vaccinated children have conclusively demonstrated that vaccines cause only minor side effects, with no documented serious consequences or vaccine-associated deaths. Conversely, refraining from vaccination poses real and immediate danger. For instance, measles is highly contagious and potentially fatal, and has repeatedly devastated the ultra-Orthodox community, most recently claiming the lives of two infants as mentioned above.

Even if there were merit to the claims that vaccination poses a remote danger, a person is obligated to risk facing an unlikely Sakana to protect against an immediate life-threatening danger. Similarly, it is both reasonable and a Midas Chasidus (an act of piety) to accept remote risk to save others from clear and present Sakana. At the very least, no prohibition exists against doing so. Therefore, from a halachic perspective, vaccination is an unquestionable obligation, and one must not be swayed by unfounded speculation about alleged dangers.

In this context, we must address an essential Halachic question: what measures can the community take against vaccine refusers?

It is not permissible to directly coerce an individual who refuses to vaccinate his children, despite multiple Halachic sources that provide a basis for compelling medical treatment against one’s will. This is because vaccination is not considered a matter of Pikuach Nefesh at the individual level. Even a sick person whose condition is not life-threatening cannot be forced to undergo medical treatment; indeed, a healthy person seeking to avoid a preventive measure against a disease they perceive as having a low probability of serious harm cannot be compelled to act. Although vaccinations are intended to save many lives from a broader perspective, that is not sufficient to justify coercion of an individual who refuses them, even though he is obligated to vaccinate from a Halachic standpoint.

In addition, leading Poskim have ruled that one cannot compel a person to undergo medical treatment, even life-saving treatment, if he relies on the opinion of another physician who supports their position, arguing that the treatment is unproven or uncertain. Accordingly, while a patient facing an absolute medical consensus might not be able to rely on a solitary dissenting opinion, the current vaccination debate – despite overwhelming scientific support for immunization – still contains scattered dissent. Therefore, a person who refuses vaccination based on a fringe belief may have Halachic grounds to do so in the strict sense, even though such opinions represent an extreme minority view that contradicts decades of established research and near-universally accepted medical practice.

However, we must consider the following crucial distinction: While a person may make personal medical decisions and follow the opinion of a lone medical expert against prevailing views – even though his life is not solely his own and his body is not entirely his possession – this applies only when the matter concerns his individual welfare. When the decision affects the lives and safety of the broader community, collective rights take precedence, and the established medical opinion must be followed. In such cases, an individual cannot justify potentially harmful actions to the public based on the opinion of a single dissenting physician.

Notwithstanding the above, the options for enforcement remain limited. Coercion can only take the form of communal or social sanctions, not physical compulsion.

In an as-yet unpublished Teshuva, Rav Asher wrote:

In my humble opinion, it seems clear that this is an error; it is evident that the obligation rests upon parents to vaccinate their children. I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize and compel educational institutions not to accept children who are not vaccinated.