The Final Blow

There are numerous Halachos concerning an individual identified as a Goses, which refers to a person in the final stages of life. An intriguing, lesser-known discussion appears in the Gemara in Sanhedrin (78a):

If ten men struck someone with ten sticks and he died – whether they struck him simultaneously or one after another – they are exempt. R’ Yehuda ben Beseira says: If they struck him one after another, the last one is liable, because he hastened his death.

R’ Yocḥanan said: Both derive their views from the same Pasuk: “v’Ish Ki Yakeh Kol Nefesh” (“If a man strikes any human life.”)  (Vayikra 24:17). The Rabbanan interpret “Kol“ to mean that he is only liable when he took the entire life at once (“Kol Nefesh”). R’ Yehuda ben Beseira holds that “Kol” includes taking a minimal remnant of life (“Kol d’Hu Nefesh”).

Rava said: All agree that a person who kills a Tereifa is exempt, and if he kills a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim, he is liable. The dispute concerns a Goses b’Yedei Adam. One view compares him to a Tereifa; the other compares him to a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim.

The one who likens him to a Tereifa – why does he not compare him to a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim? Because in the case of a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim, no human act brought about his condition, whereas here a human act did. And the one who likens him to a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim – why does he not compare him to a Tereifa? Because in the case of a Tereifa, the Simanim have been severed, whereas here they have not.

The Gemara makes a clear distinction between a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim – where the impending death came about through natural causes – and a Goses b’Yedei Adam – where human actions have threatened his life. Everyone agrees that one is liable for killing a person in the former case. The Machlokes is whether one is liable for killing a person who has been mortally injured by human action.

There are several key points to note here:

First, Tosfos ask why the person who delivered the first blow isn’t liable, even though the final striker is exempt according to the Rabbanan (because the victim was already dying and he did not kill the entire (“Kol”) Nefesh. Their question assumes that, since most Gosesim die, rendering a person a Goses should be a capital crime, as we follow the Rov in Dinei Nefashos.

            Tosfos provide an insightful resolution. Later in Sanhedrin, the Gemara states that when someone strikes another, we wait to see whether the blow will be fatal before punishing the assailant. Even if the Sanhedrin assesses the attack as potentially deadly, the victim is not considered murdered while alive. Although we generally follow the majority in Dinei Nefashos, other possibilities must also be considered.^[1] Therefore, if a second attacker strikes the victim and kills him, the first attacker is exempt, since the fatal result was not yet certain when the second blow occurred.

There is much to discuss regarding Tosfos’ assertion. We will suffice by noting that the Minchas Chinuch (Mitzva 34-5) points out that, according to the Shev Sh’maitsa (4-8), we do not follow the Rov in Dinei Nefashos unless other arguments support it. This would offer another way to resolve Tosfos’ question.

Regarding the core issue, we see a clear distinction between those who are dying naturally and those brought to the brink of death through human action. At first glance, this seems difficult: Why should this distinction affect the liability of the last person to strike? After all, the reality seems similar in both cases: the victim has already received a nearly fatal blow, and the additional strike hastens his death. If the Rabbanan hold that liability arises only when the blow constitutes “Kol Nefesh,” what is the difference between these two situations?

In fact, the Rosh (Nazir 4, s.v. “v’Dilma”) maintains that even according to those who hold that a Kohen or Nazir may not come into contact or proximity with a Goses for fear that they will become Tamei, this only applies to a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim, not a Goses b’Yedei Adam. This supports the following definition:

A Goses b’Yedei Shamayim is so close to death that he is considered almost dead already, and a Kohen or Nazir is forbidden to approach or be in contact with him. However, a Goses b’Yedei Adam, though technically in a dying state, is not yet regarded as dead.cIf so, the distinction between the two is a matter of Metzius. Natural death is seen as approaching finality, while death by human action is not yet final.

However, the Gemara above, which states that one who kills a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim is liable but one who kills a Goses b’Yedei Adam is exempt, indicates the opposite! This is noted by the Chasam Sofer (Y.D. 351).

The Ramah comments on the Gemara:

All agree regarding a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim; if another comes and hastens his death, he is liable – because he is taking the entire life. According to the Rabbanan, the Pasuk only excludes a case where one takes part of someone’s life, and another takes the remainder. This is the implication of the Pasuk: “a man who strikes Kol Nefesh”, meaning, [he is] only [liable when] the whole Nefesh is taken by one person,  not when it is partially taken by someone else.

They only argue regarding a Goses b’Yedei Adam. For example, if the first person struck him and caused him to become a Goses, and the second strike hastens his death. The Rabbanan liken him to a Tereifa; thus, they explain that “Kol Nefesh” refers to the whole Nefesh. However, R’ Yosi bar Yehuda likens him to a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim, and thus explains “Kol Nefesh” to refer to “Kol d’Hu Nefesh”.

The Gemara does not distinguish between whether the person is considered alive or dead. The key difference lies in the cause of the impending death – was it human action or natural events?^[2] If someone becomes a Goses due to an assault or injury perpetrated by another person, we view the blow as having the potential to cause death, and the victim is considered a Tereifa. Conversely, when a person is dying of natural causes, although part of his life has already been taken, he retains his vitality and there is no definable force that is causing his death.

The Bad Kodesh (Bava Kama 23) explains that when a death results from human action, there are two contributors: the one who initiated the assault and the one who delivered the final blow. Because the first assailant set the process in motion, the second is not held fully liable. In contrast, if a person dies by the hand of Heaven, with no prior human involvement, the individual who causes the fatal injury is fully responsible. Thus, the exemption is not because the victim is already considered dead, but rather because the second individual did not act alone.

A similar approach can be applied to the Rambam (Hilchos Rotzei’ach 4:6):

If ten men strike a person with ten sticks and he dies, whether they struck simultaneously or one after another, they are exempt from execution by Beis Din, as it states: “Kol Nefesh Adam” – until one person takes the entire life.

Liability is determined by the act of murder itself, rather than by “how much” of the victim was killed (which might be assumed from the phrase “Kol Nefesh”). Only individuals who act alone are held responsible; those who do not act alone are exempt.

This presents a significant practical distinction in terms of determining the culpability of a second attacker: if an individual sustains a traumatic injury without human involvement and is subsequently fatally wounded by an assailant, is he classified as a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim or Goses b’Yedai Adam? If the determination depends on whether the dying process can be attributed to a specific cause, then there should be no distinction between an intentional traumatic injury and a spontaneous injury.

However, if the liability of the second attacker hinges not on the victim’s prognosis at the time of the attack but on the act of murder itself, then a person is only liable when he alone is responsible for the death. Where a prior traumatic injury exists but carries no human liability^[3], there is no shared culpability to dilute the assailant’s responsibility. The victim should therefore be considered a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim, leaving the second attacker fully liable.

R’ Akiva Eiger (Y.D. 415:12) discusses whether a Bechor who becomes a Goses b’Yedei Adam requires Pidyon haBen. Since the Gemara states that one who kills a Goses b’Yedei Adam is exempt because the victim is already considered dead, perhaps Pidyon is similarly not required (as is the Halacha for a Tereifa). Usually, a Goses or one about to be executed is still obligated in Pidyon, as stated by the Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Kama 1:30). The uncertainty here hinges on whether a person dying by human hand is regarded as effectively dead, which depends on the distinctions we discussed above.

Two final notes:

1. The Kovetz Shitos Kamai (Bava Basra 127b) indicates that the distinction between a Goses b’Yedei Shamayim and Goses b’Yedei Adam is not based on the level of danger to life, but solely on the interpretation of the Pesukim.
2. The Gemara in Yevamos (120a) discusses whether a Meguyad [one heavily wounded by sword blows, according to Rashi] is considered alive and whether it is certain he will die. Tosfos (ad loc., s.v.“l’Memra”) suggest that a Meguyad is considered a Goses b’Yedei Adam who will inevitably die. This is also apparent in the Tosfos haRosh (ibid.).

[1] [Editor’s note: Namely, the possibility that this individual Goses belongs to the minority who do not die. We therefore cannot establish that the initial strike was fatal and the first assailant cannot be convicted of murder merely for rendering the victim a Goses.]

[2] [Editor’s note: This could also be framed as a question of Metzius vs. Ma’ase Retzicha.]

[3] Whether because it was accidental, self-inflicted, or otherwise