Rabbi Yossi SprungThis is a continuation of last week’s discussion regarding someone who is unable to speak reciting Brachos through Hirhur (contemplating the words of the Bracha) and cases of Ones. This week’s essay will focus on Birchos haNehenin.
The Gemara explains (Brachos 35a) that the obligation to recite Birchos haNehenin is a “Sevara” (logical assumption): “It is forbidden to benefit from this world without a Bracha”. Rashi explains: “Since he derived pleasure he must thank the One who created them (the foods)”.
The Gemara continues:
The Rabbis taught: It is forbidden for a person to derive pleasure from this world without a Bracha. Anyone who derives pleasure from this world without a Bracha has committed Me’ila[1]… R’ Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Anybody who derives pleasure from this world without a Bracha is as if he benefited from Kodshei Shamayim, as the Posuk states, “To Hashem is the world and all that is in it” (Tehillim 24:1). R’ Levi raised the following contradiction: It is stated, “To Hashem is the world and all that is in it” but it is also stated, “The heavens are the heavens of Hashem but He gave the earth to human beings”? [He answered:] It is not difficult. This [Posuk] refers to before the Bracha and this [Posuk] refers to after the Bracha. R’ Chanina bar Papa said: Anybody who derives pleasure from this world without a Bracha is as if he stole from Hashem and Kneses Yisrael.
The Gemara defines the prohibition to derive pleasure from this world without a Bracha in two ways, as an Isur and as Me’ila. The Gemara then elaborates on the nature of the “theft”. Before the Bracha, the food belongs to Hashem, and following the Bracha it enters the domain of man. Failing to recite a Bracha and then deriving pleasure is thus a form of theft. In summary, the obligation to recite a Bracha is based firstly on a Sevara – “Since he derived pleasure he must thank the One who created them (the foods)” – and secondly on the fact that it would be Gezeila to fail to do so. Are these two reasons connected or dependent on each other?
This brings the point raised at the conclusion of the previous essay into sharper focus. In a situation of Ones, we can certainly absolve a person of the obligation to recite a Bracha, in other words, the obligation to “thank the One who created them”. It is not his fault that he cannot recite a Bracha; there is no reason to prevent him from eating to boot! However, does an Ones permit him to commit “Gezeila”?
This is discussed by many of the Acharonim as we will see below. However, we will first raise an interesting inference from Rashi’s comments that may change the picture.
At the start of the Sugya, Rashi explains the Sevara of Birchos haNehenin as being an obligation to “thank the One who created them (the foods)”. Later, when the Gemara introduces the notion of Gezeila Rashi explains it in a novel way. Rather than state that a person who fails to recite a Bracha “is as if he stole the food from Hashem”, Rashi explains, “he has stolen from Hashem – His Bracha”!
The Maharsha (ad. loc.) asks why Rashi interprets the Gemara in this fashion. The Gemara there clearly states that before the Bracha, the food belongs to Hashem and only enters man’s domain afterward. The more obvious and simpler explanation of the subsequent statement that a person who fails to recite a Bracha is “stealing” would have been that he is stealing the food from Hashem, not the Bracha!
Perhaps Rashi understands that although the food belongs to Hashem before a Bracha, it is designated for man’s use and benefit. He is considered a “Ba’al Chov” – he owes something before he may benefit from it, namely the Bracha. By failing to recite a Bracha, he has not stolen the food, as it was set aside for his use, but he has failed to pay his “Chov”. He is considered to have stolen the Bracha, not the food.
If so, we may postulate that in a situation of Ones a person does not commit “theft” at all. Hashem does not impose a Chov on a person who is unable to pay it; He does not “expect” a Bracha in these circumstances.
The Pnei Yehoshua famously raised the following question on the Sugya cited above: Since the obligation of a Bracha is derived from a Sevara, why isn’t it a Mitzva d’Oraisa? Chaza”l state that “a Sevara is a d’Oraisa”[2], thus a Mitzva derived from a Sevara should be a Mitzva d’Oraisa even though it is not stated explicitly in the Torah. This would have enormous ramifications for of the most famous rules in Hilchos Brachos, “Safek Brachos l’Hakel – We are lenient in any doubt in Brachos”. If Brachos were a Mitzva d’Oraisa, this would certainly not be the case since “Safek d’Oraisa l’Chumra – We are stringent in any doubt in d’Oraisa matters”.
The Pnei Yehoshua answers that the principle of “Safek d’Oraisa l’Chumra” cannot be applied in this case because reciting a Bracha Levatala is an Isur d’Oraisa. Thus, if a person is in doubt as to whether to recite a Bracha, he cannot simply be “Machmir” because he is being Meikil about the possibility of Bracha Levatala. (This assertion is extremely important in Hilchos Brachos, however, further discussion is beyond the scope of this essay.)
Many Acharonim maintain that the Pnei Yehoshua’s question is based on a false premise. They argue that the principle of “Safek Brachos l’Hakel” does not apply to Birchos haNehenin because “it is forbidden to derive pleasure from this world without a Bracha” and one who does so has committed Me’ila. (The basic argument is made by the Maharsha to Pesachim 102a).
Some say that this position is also held by Tosfos. The Gemara in Brachos (12a) discusses a case in which it is doubtful whether one should recite a Bracha or not. Tosfos rule (ad. loc. s.v. “Lo”): “As a stringency, he needs to recite the Bracha again”. The Magen Avraham wonders (209:3) why Tosfos do not instead invoke the principle of “Safek Brachos l’Hakel”. R’ Akiva Eiger answers that Tosfos hold that this principle does not apply to Birchos haNehenin, as explained above.
R’ Akiva Eiger also dismisses the Pnei Yehoshua’s argument that if a person recites a Bracha in a case of Safek he risks uttering a Bracha Levatala: “There is no concern of Bracha Levatala, for if he does not recite a Bracha it will be forbidden for him to drink!” In other words, since the person cannot drink due to the Safek (for it is forbidden to derive pleasure from the world without a Bracha), the Bracha cannot be considered “Levatala” since it permits him to drink.
The above discussion clearly portrays the two sides of our question. The Pnei Yehoshua apparently only takes the obligation of Birchas heNehenin into account, therefore, we say Safek Brachos l’Hakel in a case of doubt. (Though, as explained above, since he holds that Brachos should constitute a Mitzva d’Oraisa, he asks that we should instead invoke the principle of “Safek d’Oraisa l’Chumra.” According to those who hold – which is the position adopted in Halacha – that Birchos haNehenin are only a Mitzva d’Rabbanan, it is obvious that in a case of Safek a person may eat without a Bracha.)
On the other side, the Maharsha (and many others[3]) hold that Birchos haNehenin are not only a Mitzva (like Birchos haMitzvos, for example) but also the means of lifting the Isur to derive pleasure from the world before a Bracha. Therefore, the principle of Safek Brachos l’Hakel does not apply because one cannot waive the Isur in a case of doubt.
The Shulchan Aruch rules (O.C. 209) that Safek Brachos l’Hakel applies to Birchos haNehenin. It follows that in the case of Ones, a person would be permitted to eat without a Bracha.
All of the above is predicated on the assumption that the obligation of Birchos haNehenin and the Isur to benefit from this world without a Bracha are independent of each other. However, as we alluded to above, the two may be connected. The Gezeila or Me’ila is the very fact that the person derives pleasure from the world without fulfilling his obligation to recite a Bracha. If so, in the case of Ones where a person’s obligation is waived there would also be no Isur.
Rav Shmuel Wosner zt”l (Shevet haLevi 6:23) makes a similar argument. He discusses a patient in a hospital who was unable to recite a Bracha. The Sho’el made the above argument that the state of Ones could only waive the obligation to recite a Bracha but could not lift the Isur of deriving pleasure from the world without a Bracha.
Rav Wosner replied that the Isur is indeed not lifted in the case of Ones, yet it is still permissible for the patient to eat without a Bracha. The Mishna explicitly permits a Ba’al Keri to eat due to his state of Ones (see last week’s essay), and the same would apply to other examples of Ones. It is highly unlikely that the Mishna only permitted it in a case of Pikuach Nefesh. Moreover, we may argue that since the Chachamim did not insist upon fulfilling the Mitzva of Birchos haNehenin in a case of Ones, they would also not have considered there to be an Isur in these circumstances.
Rav Wosner then notes that this conclusion does not appear to fit with the Mishna Berura’s ruling (Biur Halacha 62, discussed in the previous essay) that it is forbidden to drink in a Beis haMerchatz. Surely, since the person is an Ones he should be absolved of the obligation of Birchos haNehenin and should be able to drink without a Bracha. [4]
Rav Wosner answers that the Mishna Berura’s main argument is that the person is able to leave the Beis haMerchatz to drink. He explains:
We need to add a little to his words. Certainly, the small amount of time it takes to leave the Beis haMerchatz or to enter another room does not constitute an Ones to absolve him [of the obligation of Birchos haNehenin]. However, an extended period, even if it would not constitute Pikuach Nefesh, could certainly be considered an Ones. The limit, in my humble opinion, would be a loss of an entire day of eating – a complete day of fasting. This is certainly an absolute Ones and a matter of distress and to many people it would be harmful. This is the context of the case in Brachos of a Ba’al Keri.
Rav Asher Weiss Shlit”a disputes Rav Wosner’s ruling (Minchas Asher 2:21). According to Rav Asher, the Shiur of “a loss of an entire day of eating” is too long. Though we cannot consider a short amount of time to be an Ones for which one is exempt from a Bracha, and we would instruct a person in that situation to wait until he can recite a Bracha, however, an amount of time that would cause distress or difficulty would constitute an absolute Ones, even if it was not an entire day.
We should point out that the Biur Halacha also implies that an extreme Shiur is unnecessary. He only states that a person in a Beis haMerchatz is able to leave the premises to make a Bracha or move to another room – he does not imply that a person would be obliged to make a greater effort than that, such as an entire day without food!
[1] Improper mundane use of something that is Hekdesh, here used to refer to a form of Gezeila (theft).
[2] [Editor’s note: The Pnei Yehoshua bases this assertion on the question that the Gemara asks in several places (Kesubos 22a, Bava Kama 46b, Niddah 25a), “Lama Li Kra? Sevara Hu!”]
[3] We should point out that the aforementioned Magen Avraham disagrees with the Maharsha and offers a different interpretation of the comments of Tosfos cited above.
[4] We may also point out that the Biur Halacha (and, more clearly, in the Mishna Berura ad loc. 9) clearly implies that in a true case of Ones a person may eat without a Bracha, as we conclude in this essay. See also Minchas Shlomo, Mahdura Kama 18 where this inference is made.
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