Rabbi Yosef SprungWomen may experience partial or complete hair loss due to various medical reasons. Some have conditions that lead to significant hair thinning, while others experience temporary or permanent hair loss from medical treatments. Additionally, hair may be shaved for medical procedures, surgery, or due to skin conditions affecting the scalp and hair growth. These situations can occur at any age and may last from a few months to lifelong, chronic states.
For many women, hair carries deep personal, social, and emotional significance. Losing it can affect self-image, personal identity, and the way they perceive themselves and are perceived by others. As a result, various solutions are often used to help restore a more familiar appearance, including wigs, head coverings, and other medical or cosmetic options. These realities can give rise to practical and halachic questions.
In a previous essay[1], we examined the laws of Chatzitza as they relate to a wig affixed to the scalp. In this essay, we will focus on a question raised by several Poskim: When a wig is attached directly to the head and closely resembles a woman’s natural hair, does it raise a concern of Maris Ayin (the appearance of impropriety)?
Maris Ayin and Chashad
The Shiltei Giborim permits women to go out in public wearing a Sheitel. The Be’er Sheva raises several objections, including the concern of Maris Ayin. The Gemara mentions that a woman may go out in public wearing a wig “so that she appears to have hair”. According to the Shiltei Giborim, this means the wig is meant to appear as her natural hair. The Be’er Sheva sharply objects:
Heaven forbid! How could it be permissible for a woman to present herself as though she were violating the law of Moshe? Going out with hair uncovered is Asur Min haTorah, as stated in Perek HaMadir … Moreover, the Chachamim prohibited many practices for women because of Maris Ayin.
Following this line of reasoning, several Poskim also argued that Sheitels should be prohibited on grounds of Maris Ayin, including Mahar”i Mintz (cited by the Be’er Sheva), Divrei Chaim (Y.D. 2:59), and Maharil Diskin (Kuntres Acharon 113).
However, the majority of Poskim do not regard Sheitels as problematic on this basis. Why not?
The answer lies in understanding that the Issur of Maris Ayin is generally divided into two distinct categories:
1. Suspicion (Chashad)
This concerns situations in which observers may wrongly suspect a person of committing an Issur. For example, the Gemara (Avoda Zara 43b) prohibits wearing a ring engraved with a human face because of Chashad. Rashi explains that people might assume the wearer worships the image.
2. Maris Ayin
This applies when an action merely appears to be prohibited, even if no actual wrongdoing is taking place. For example, the Gemara (Avoda Zara 12a) forbids bending down to drink from a spring located beneath an idol, because it appears as though one is bowing to the idol.
The Achronim, including the Chesed l’Avraham (1:21) and R’ Shlomo Kluger (u’Vacharta ba’Chaim 68), explain the distinction between the two categories:
Chashad refers to conduct that may lead observers to conclude that one is committing a transgression.
Maris Ayin refers to conduct that may lead observers to mistakenly infer that a prohibited act is permitted. The act was entirely permissible, but it resembled a prohibited act.
A useful illustration appears in the Gemara (Avoda Zara 43b), which relates that leading Amoraim entered a shul containing a statue of the king. The Gemara explains that they were not concerned about Chashad – that people might suspect them of idol worship – because there is no such suspicion when an act is performed publicly by a group. People naturally understand that a group entering a shul is doing so for Tefila, not for an illicit purpose.
This distinction makes sense only with respect to Chashad. When many people are involved, suspicion that they are engaging in wrongdoing is greatly diminished. However, regarding Maris Ayin, where the concern is that observers may draw incorrect halachic conclusions, the opposite may sometimes be true: a public display can increase the likelihood that others will erroneously conclude that a prohibited practice is permitted.
Furthermore, while Maris Ayin is a Gezeira mid’Rabbanan enacted to prevent mistaken inferences, the obligation to avoid conduct that gives rise to Chashad may have a biblical basis. Evidence for this can be found in the Mishna (Shekalim 3:2) that teaches that the official entering the treasury chamber of the Beis Hamikdash to withdraw funds was not permitted to enter wearing shoes, sandals, tefillin, or any item in which money could be concealed. The concern was that people might suspect him of stealing from the treasury and, “A person must be free of suspicion in the eyes of others just as he must be free of guilt before Hashem as the Pasuk states, ‘You shall be innocent before Hashem and before Yisrael’ (Bamidbar 32:22).” (See also Igros Moshe O.C. 4:82.)
haGaon Rav Asher Weiss Shlit”a notes that these concepts are often not treated as entirely distinct categories and are sometimes used interchangeably by the Rishonim. Nevertheless, the distinction outlined above provides an important framework for understanding this area of halacha.
May we prohibit new cases on the basis of Maris Ayin?
Is the concern of Maris Ayin limited to cases specifically identified by Chaza”l, or should any new situation that creates a similar appearance of impropriety also be prohibited?
The Gemara rules that although fish blood is permitted, it may not be consumed if it appears indistinguishable from animal blood, because of Maris Ayin, unless fish scales are placed alongside it. This ruling is codified by the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 66).
From this ruling, Poskim derived additional applications that are not explicitly mentioned in the Gemara.
A) Meat and human milk
Shu”t haRashba states (3:257):
You asked regarding meat cooked in human milk. Since human milk, once expressed, is permitted, there is technically no prohibition involved. Nevertheless, should it be prohibited because of Maris Ayin, just as the Chachamim were concerned about fish blood when no scales are present? It seems that cooking it should indeed be prohibited – and certainly eating it when recognizable – based on the same principle as fish blood…”
This ruling is similarly codified by the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 87:4).
B) Meat and almond milk
The Rema (Y.D. 87:3) rules:
The custom is to prepare almond milk and cook poultry with it, since the prohibition of poultry and milk is only d’Rabbanan. However, when using milk with animal meat, almonds should be placed nearby due to Maris Ayin.
Clearly, according to the Rema, the principle of Maris Ayin may be extended to new situations not explicitly addressed by Chaza”l, but only where the appearance involves a potential violation of a d’Oraisa.
However, the Shach (Y.D. 87:6) cites several sources indicating that Maris Ayin applies even to Issurim d’Rabbanan. He attributes this view to the Maharsha”l and endorses it himself. Similarly, the Taz (ibid. 4) maintains that, ideally, almonds should be placed alongside almond milk even when it is served with poultry.
Based on these precedents, one might argue that a Sheitel should be prohibited on the grounds of Maris Ayin even though no such prohibition is found in Chaza”l. After all, the act in question concerns a d’Oraisa, thus even the Rema would be stringent.
However, this is the subject of significant disagreement among the Poskim.
The Pri Chadash challenges the very premise that later generations possess the authority to create new prohibitions based on Maris Ayin. He raises this objection in several contexts. One example concerns a ruling cited by the Magen Avraham (O.C. 463:5):
In Constantinople, the practice is to prohibit making patties or frying fish with matza meal, because it may be mistaken for ordinary flour.
The Machatzis haShekel explains that the source of this ruling is the K’neses haGedola, who reports an actual incident in that city. One woman observed her neighbor frying food with matza meal and mistakenly concluded that frying with ordinary breadcrumbs was permissible as well. As a result, people came to violate the Issur of Chametz on Pesach. Following this incident, the practice developed to prohibit such conduct because of Maris Ayin.
The Pri Chadash (O.C. 461:2) objected, arguing that we lack the authority to institute new decrees due to Maris Ayin. A similar position is adopted by R’ Moshe Feinstein zt”l, whose arguments we will cite below.
Accordingly, the question of whether wearing a Sheitel is Mutar or Asur is subject to this Machlokes haPoskim.
When the permissible practice is widely known
Even so, under contemporary circumstances – when it is well known that many observant Jewish women wear Sheitels as a form of hair covering – there is a strong basis for those Poskim who maintain that no concern of Maris Ayin exists in this context. This is reflected by the Mishna Berura (75:15):
The Pri Megadim states that in places where women customarily go out with uncovered Sheitels, one may rely on the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch. It further appears from his discussion that even if the hair was originally that woman’s and was cut off and reattached to her head, it may be treated leniently. The Magen Giborim, however, is stringent on this point. The Pri Megadim adds that where it is not the local custom for women to wear Sheitels, the stringent view should certainly be followed because of Maris Ayin.
Apparently, where the practice of wearing Sheitels is common, the concern of Maris Ayin falls away. But why should that be the case? Surely, the Sheitel may look identical to natural hair.
The source of this argument can be traced to the Rosh (end of chapter 9 of Nida). The Mishnah in Kilayim (9:2) states that certain silk-like fabrics (Shirayim and Kalach) may not be combined with wool or linen because of Maris Ayin. Although these materials are not subject to the prohibition of Sha’atnez, observers might mistakenly assume that the garment contains Sha’atnez.
The Rosh comments:
However, silk garments are common nowadays, and everyone is familiar with them. Therefore, there is no prohibition of combining any type of silk with wool or linen.”
The same principle is mentioned by the Bartenura (ibid.) and is codified by the Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 298:1).
The rationale is that once a permitted alternative becomes common and widely recognized, neither of the two concerns underlying Chashad and Maris Ayin apply:
- Chashad – Observers are unlikely to assume that a person is violating a prohibition. Instead, they will reasonably assume that he is making use of a permitted alternative, such as a fabric that is not subject to the laws of Sha’atnez.
- Maris Ayin – Observers are unlikely to draw mistaken halachic conclusions. Rather than concluding that a prohibited practice is permitted, they will understand that one category is permitted while another remains prohibited.
The Rosh’s ruling is a natural extension of the approach taken by those Rishonim who apply Maris Ayin to situations not explicitly discussed by Chaza”l. They reasoned that Maris Ayin depends on contemporary reality. If so, the principle works in both directions: Just as new circumstances can potentially create concerns for Maris Ayin, changing circumstances can also eliminate concerns that once existed.
To be continued…
[1] Chukas 5785
Rabbi Yosef Sprung
