A Hairy Situation – Part 2

In last week’s essay, we began a discussion of whether a wig that closely resembles natural hair raises concerns for Maris Ayin. We cited the opinions of the Shiltei Giborim, who permits wearing a Sheitel in public, and of the Be’er Sheva and others, who forbid the practice. Following a clarification of Chashad (where others might suspect someone of violating Halacha) and Maris Ayin (where observers may wrongly conclude that a prohibited act is permissible), we reviewed a Machlokes haPoskim whether Maris Ayin can be applied to situations not explicitly discussed by Chaza”l. The essay concluded with the presentation of a basis for leniency: when the permissible practice is well-known, eliminating the concerns of both Chashad and Maris Ayin.

Based on the principle we introduced at the conclusion of last week’s essay, which later authorities discuss at considerable length, most Poskim rule leniently in several cases where both prohibited and permitted methods are widely known. Some examples include:

1. Shaving the beard.

There is generally no concern that an observer will assume a man shaved with a razor, since widely recognized halachically permissible methods of shaving exist.

2. Consuming non-dairy (Pareve) milk and butter substitutes together with meat.

Since such products are common, observers do not automatically assume that actual dairy products are being consumed.

3. Sheitels

Many Poskim apply the same reasoning to Sheitels. See, for example, the Minchas Elazar (1:66–67).

The rationale would apply even to a professionally crafted Sheitel that is virtually indistinguishable from natural hair, as well as to cases in which a wig is affixed directly to the scalp because of a medical condition. If Sheitels are a well-known and accepted form of head covering, the fact that a particular wig appears highly natural does not create a concern of Maris Ayin.

When no distinguishing feature exists

Nevertheless, some Poskim adopt a different approach. They argue that if there is absolutely no visible distinction between the prohibited appearance and the permitted alternative, a concern of Maris Ayin may remain, even where the public is generally aware that a permissible alternative exists.

A noteworthy example appears in Minchas Shlomo (Tinyana 53), concerning the use of shoes made of synthetic material on Yom Kippur that are virtually indistinguishable from leather shoes:

I was asked whether it is permissible to wear shoes made of “Corfam” on Yom Kippur, [as their] appearance is virtually identical to leather shoes… It seems to me that the concept of Maris Ayin discussed in the Gemara refers to something that is [definitely] permissible but appears to be a prohibited act and is therefore forbidden. This is well known in the cases of fish blood and almond milk consumed with meat. Accordingly, since Corfam shoes appear to be leather shoes, they would seem to fall within the category of Maris Ayin. As for the widespread permissibility of Sheitels, I believe the justification is that most people can distinguish them, even though I myself often cannot. Since the Gemara in Yoma (78b) also discusses Maris Ayin in connection with footwear on Yom Kippur… it therefore appears to me that these shoes should be prohibited.

This rationale has been adopted by other Poskim as well, who maintain that some recognizable indication should exist showing that the item in question is not actually the prohibited object. According to this view, we must carefully consider whether the leniency applies to a Sheitel that is entirely indistinguishable from natural hair.

The position of R’ Moshe Feinstein zt”l

In a well-known Teshuva (Igros Moshe, E.H. 2:12), R’ Moshe addresses this issue directly. He notes that some Poskim prohibited wigs on grounds of Maris Ayin, but counters:

Nevertheless, the majority of our Chachamim – including those upon whom the foundations of practical halachic ruling primarily rest – permit them. This includes the Rema, both [in O.C 75] and in Darkei Moshe to O.C. 303, as well as the Magen Avraham and Pri Megadim. The view of the Vilna Gaon likewise appears to be that no prohibition of Maris Ayin applies in this case…

To explain this, R’ Moshe identifies the same three fundamental considerations discussed above:

1. The Chachamim never enacted such a prohibition

The reason is straightforward: Since we do not find in the Gemara that Sheitels were prohibited, we cannot derive a new prohibition by analogy from other cases of Maris Ayin. One case cannot be learned from another. Therefore, whenever the Chachamim prohibited something because of Maris Ayin, the prohibition was stated specifically with respect to that matter…

This follows the approach of the Pri Chadash and others, as discussed above.

2. The difference is recognizable in most cases

Furthermore, in most cases, it is evident that it is a Sheitel. Even if this is not apparent to men who do not look closely enough at women to notice such distinctions, it is certainly apparent to women in the overwhelming majority of cases – perhaps even in all cases. Therefore, because there are occasional rare instances where it is not recognizable, it is not prohibited… Since a woman primarily finds herself among other women who recognize that it is a Sheitel, there is no reason to prohibit it because of the mistaken assumptions of those who cannot identify it; such knowledge is considered generally established.

3. The permitted alternative is widely known

There is another major reason why Sheitels were not prohibited. Since everyone knows that Sheitels are worn and are intended to resemble a woman’s own hair, there is no basis for prohibition. Why should an observer at a distance suspect wrongdoing? Those who do not look closely at women would not assume the visible hair is hers because she is presumed to be a respectable woman, and they also know that, up close, they would certainly see that it is not her own hair. And those who do observe her closely will, in most cases, recognize that it is a Sheitel.

R’ Moshe then addresses an argument that might be raised in modern times, namely that because many women unfortunately go without any head covering, observers might assume that a woman wearing a highly realistic wig is likewise uncovering her natural hair. He rejects this for two reasons:

First, we do not create new Issurim that the Gemara or the Geonim never established.

Second, no meaningful harm results from such an assumption. Those who know the woman personally are aware that she is observant and will not suspect her of wrongdoing. Those who do not know her and mistakenly assume she belongs to the category of women who do not cover their hair will learn nothing from her that they have not already seen elsewhere.

R’ Moshe’s conclusion

Therefore, as a matter of practical halacha, Your Honor cannot object to your esteemed wife wearing a Sheitel. Even if you personally wish to adopt a stricter position, you may not impose your stringencies upon her, for this is a matter that pertains to her. Since she is acting in accordance with the halacha as understood by the majority of the Poskim, and the Halacha appears to follow their view, you have no basis to require greater stringency of her.

In our case, the grounds for leniency are even stronger. Not only is the woman presumed to be observant, but in many cases, it will be known that she has suffered hair loss due to a medical condition and that the hair she is wearing is not her own.

Further, even according to the more stringent approach, wearing a headband, scarf, or other accessories commonly worn with a Sheitel could provide a sufficient visual indication that the hair is a Sheitel rather than natural hair.

This discussion is intended as an academic Halachic analysis only and should not be relied upon as a practical ruling.