Chinuch for Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

In recent years, an increasing number of Halachic questions have arisen concerning children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). These children may possess average – or even above-average – intellectual abilities, yet at the same time struggle to grasp abstract concepts, distinguish between complex situations, or apply principles learned in one context to another. These characteristics give rise to many practical questions regarding both their obligation to observe Mitzvos and the parameters of the Mitzva of Chinuch.

The issue generally does not concern their ultimate obligation to observe Mitzvos once they reach adulthood. In many cases, these children clearly do not fall under the Halachic category of a Shoteh, and the straightforward assumption is that they will become fully obligated in Mitzvos. The main question is how to educate young children with ASD: Should laws of Chinuch be applied the same way as they are to other children – differing only in pace or starting age – or does such a child require a different standard, since he may have the ability to perform Mitzvos or avoid Isurim, yet struggles with the situational distinctions in Halachic observance?

For example, a six-year-old child with ASD may understand that it is forbidden to move Muktza on Shabbos, yet be unable to comprehend how an adult is permitted to move Muktza indirectly – such as with a different body part or in an unusual manner. From the child’s perspective, this appears to be an irreconcilable contradiction. Should he nevertheless be trained to observe the prohibition, even though he cannot understand the Halachic distinction? Or, since he is incapable of grasping the complexity of the law, should education in this area be postponed until a later stage?

This example is by no means unique to the laws of Muktza. Similar questions arise in many areas, where Halacha distinguishes between different situations, but the child struggles to grasp the basis for those distinctions. To address this issue, it is first necessary to define the general nature and scope of the Mitzva of Chinuch.

The Moriah Journal (129) records the following ruling of R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l, regarding children with limited cognitive abilities. He explains that anyone who understands the basic principles of Emuna and Mitzvos on the level of a young child – that is, who knows that Hashem gave us the Torah and that we are obligated to observe His commandments – is considered to possess sufficient understanding for purposes of Mitzva observance. Consequently, upon reaching the age of thirteen, he becomes obligated in the Mitzvos that he is able to understand, and before then he is subject to the obligation of Chinuch.

This ruling introduces an important perspective. Classical Halachic discussion generally recognizes only two categories: the Pike’ach (mentally competent) and the Shoteh (lacking legal competence). However, there are many intermediate cases in which a person is not devoid of understanding but possesses only partial comprehension, or can understand some areas but not others. R’ Shlomo Zalman’s approach indicates that no single standard can be applied to such an individual. He may be obligated in matters that he can comprehend, even if his comprehension is incomplete in other areas.

Concerning legal liability and punishment, R’ Shlomo Zalman further maintained that such a person would not be subject to punishment even after reaching adulthood. However, on this point, his view is disputed by haGaon Rav Asher Weiss Shlit”a (Minchas Asher, 2:48). Nevertheless, regarding the fundamental obligation to observe Mitzvos – and the obligation of Chinuch before adulthood – the underlying principle is generally accepted.

Based on the typical profile of many children diagnosed with moderate-to-high-functioning ASD, who do not have an intellectual disability but have trouble understanding certain concepts and applying them abstractly, it seems that they fall within the framework described by R’ Shlomo Zalman. Accordingly, once they reach the age of Mitzva obligation, they are obligated in the Mitzvos that they can understand and observe; before then, they should be educated in those Mitzvos.

It remains to clarify what degree of “understanding” is required for a child to become subject to the obligation of Chinuch.

The Mishna Berura (343:3) makes it clear that a child need not understand the reason for a Mitzva or appreciate its deeper significance. The age of Chinuch begins for Mitzvos Asei once the child can perform the Mitzva – for example, taking and waving Arba Minim or wearing Tzitzis. Religious education does not wait until the child can comprehend the Mitzva’s spiritual meaning.

The same principle applies to Isurim. A child need not possess an abstract understanding of the underlying Halachic concepts. It is sufficient that he understands that a particular act is forbidden. Were Halacha to require a full understanding of the reasons for the Mitzvos and the entire Halachic framework behind them, it would be exceedingly difficult to define the age of Chinuch, especially since many adults do not fully understand the reasons for the Mitzvos.

It follows, then, that the obligation of Chinuch is determined not by the depth of a child’s understanding, but by his practical ability to perform the Mitzva and refrain from prohibited acts.

This, however, brings our question into sharper focus. We are not discussing a child who does not know that moving Muktza is prohibited. We are dealing with a child who cannot understand how the very same act can sometimes be forbidden and at other times permitted. Should he nevertheless be educated to avoid the Isur?

A clear basis for answering this question appears in Chut Shani^[1] (Vol. 4, p. 276), discussing educating a child regarding the prohibition of Lashon haRa. R’ Karelitz rules that a child should be taught not to speak negatively about others, even though he is not yet capable of understanding that there are situations in which relating negative information is permitted (and may even be a Mitzva) if it serves a constructive purpose.

At first glance, the child faces the very same contradiction in that case as well: If speaking Lashon haRa is forbidden, how can there be situations in which it is permitted? Yet the Chut Shani rules that this does not delay the obligation of Chinuch. The child should first be taught the basic rule, and only later, as his understanding matures, can he be taught the distinctions and exceptions.

The Chut Shani emphasizes, however, that it is not enough for a child to refrain from a prohibited act merely because he was scolded at the time. The obligation of Chinuch begins only once the child has sufficient understanding to recognize that the act is forbidden, such that he will refrain from it in the future as well. Nevertheless, he need not yet be capable of understanding the entire Halachic system in all its details and nuances.

Accordingly, in the case of Muktza, the fact that a child cannot understand why Muktza may sometimes be moved indirectly does not preclude educating him that Muktza may not be moved in the ordinary way. The more complex distinctions can be taught later, once he has developed the ability to understand them.

This does not provide a complete answer to our question. Even after a child reaches the age of Chinuch, he is not taught every detail of the Mitzvos all at once. Thus, regarding Tefila, a child is not expected to learn the entire text of the Tefilos immediately. Instead, he is taught the Tefilos gradually based on his age and abilities. The Poskim also support this approach regarding laws of meat and milk, as well as other Halachic areas, emphasizing that a child should not be overwhelmed with all the details of Halacha at once.

The underlying principle appears straightforward. The Mitzva of Chinuch is not intended merely to ensure that a child performs as many Mitzvos as possible in a purely technical sense. Its purpose is to accustom the child to a life of Torah and Mitzvos, to instill Yiras Shamayim, and to prepare him to serve Hashem as an adult. Consequently, the way a child is educated is itself an integral part of the Mitzva of Chinuch.

It follows that when a particular educational approach is likely to undermine the very objective of Chinuch, one must consider whether it is truly appropriate. If overwhelming a child with too many details or attempting to explain subtle Halachic distinctions beyond his current level of understanding is likely to leave him confused, frustrated, or alienated from Halacha, then that is not the method of education the Torah intended.

These considerations are especially relevant for children with ASD. In many cases, their primary difficulty is not a resistance to accepting authority or observing Mitzvos, but rather their need to reconcile every apparent exception to a rule. When such a child encounters a situation that seems to contradict a principle he has already learned, it may undermine his confidence in the consistency of the entire Halachic system.

In such cases, it would seem inappropriate to rush into teaching exceptions and nuances. Rather, the child should first be educated in the fundamental principles. As his capacity for understanding develops, the more detailed laws and exceptional cases can gradually be introduced. This is not a relaxation of the obligation of Chinuch; it is its proper fulfillment, in a manner that best achieves its purpose.

Naturally, it is difficult to establish rigid rules in this area. Much depends on each child’s level of understanding, temperament, and the way he responds to these kinds of challenges. Nevertheless, the guiding principle would appear to be that the success of Chinuch is measured not only by how many Halachos a child has learned, but also by whether the educational process draws him closer to a life of Torah and Mitzvos – or, Chas v’Shalom, distances him from it.

[1] R’ (Shmaryahu Yosef) Nissim Karelitz zt”l, 1926-2019