Rabbi Yosef SprungIn recent days, the Beis Hora’ah of the Schlesinger Institute received a fascinating question. I asked Rabbi Raziel Fredman, a member of the Institute, to address the issue and provide a thorough, well-reasoned response. I am presenting it here for the benefit of the members of the Beis haMedrash.
Question
I am studying emotional therapy, and we recently discussed a situation in which a person is emotionally inhibited and has difficulty expressing his feelings. At times, he may carry deep, suppressed anger over painful experiences or abuse he suffered as a child.
We were taught that it can be therapeutic for him to revisit those experiences and express the anger he has been holding inside. For example, he might take a pillow and hit it repeatedly, even to the point of damaging or tearing it. The idea is that releasing some of this pent-up anger can help him connect with his feelings and emotions, express himself more freely, and ultimately become part of the healing process.
My question is whether it is permissible to give such an instruction to a patient. Chaza”l teach us that a person who breaks utensils or tears his clothing in a fit of anger is likened to one who worships idols. There is also the prohibition of Bal Tashchis, needless destruction. Could such an act nevertheless be permitted when it is done for a therapeutic purpose?
There is a further question. Assuming that expressing anger in this manner is permissible, what about a person who suffered abuse as a child and is being guided to release his anger in this way? Is it permissible for him to express his anger verbally as well, saying harsh things about the person who harmed him, such as, “I wish you were dead”, or “You deserve such-and-such punishment”, and other similarly severe statements?
Would it make a difference if the person were to state at the outset of the therapy that he does not want anyone to be punished on his account, and that he is expressing these thoughts solely for the sake of his own emotional healing? Would that make it permissible?
R’ Fredman’s Response
There is great importance in addressing suppressed anger. Apart from the benefit this can have for the individual, it may also help him behave more appropriately toward those around him, including his friends and acquaintances.
That said, your concern is well-founded. In practice, even in a therapeutic setting where the goal is to address the underlying source of the anger, one should not take a valuable object and deliberately destroy it as a means of releasing that anger. As you correctly cited, Chaza”l taught that one who breaks utensils in a fit of anger should be regarded as though he were an idolater. In addition, such destruction may constitute a violation of Bal Tashchis.
Nevertheless, as part of a therapeutic process, it would be permissible to hit or damage an object that has no significance or value, or one that was going to be thrown away in any event. Since destroying such an object does not involve Bal Tashchis, it likewise does not fall under the prohibition against breaking utensils in anger, as I will explain below. Alternatively, if this is therapeutically beneficial, the person can hit a punching bag or a similar object that will not be damaged.
As for verbal expression, as long as the person is genuinely still angry and has not yet processed that anger, he may say, “I’m angry”, or “I was deeply hurt”, particularly when the purpose is to release and work through those feelings.
However, great caution is required when it comes to bringing anger to the surface that the person has completely forgotten. Doing so may violate the prohibitions of hatred, anger, and Netira (harboring a grudge). Where there is a therapeutic need to revisit such experiences, the matter should be examined separately, both from a psychological and practical perspective and from a halachic one.
It is not permissible to allow or encourage cursing or wishing death upon another person. As a general rule, it is forbidden to curse any fellow Jew. If the person who caused the harm is one’s father or mother, the matter is even more serious. Cursing one’s parents is a grave offense, and it remains forbidden even when the parents are wicked. Stating at the beginning of the treatment he does not want anyone to be punished on his account does not make cursing permissible.
Further Explanation and Sources
Let us first examine the source for distinguishing between breaking an object that has monetary value and destroying an object that has little or no value.
The Gemara in Shabbos (105b) discusses why the Beraisa states that one who tears something in anger on Shabbos is liable for the Melacha of Kore’a (tearing). At first glance, this should be considered M’kalkel (destructive activity), and a person is generally exempt for an act of M’kalkel on Shabbos.
The Gemara initially answers: “R’ Avin said: This too is considered constructive, because he is satisfying his impulse.” In other words, tearing something in anger is considered an act of Tikun, because it relieves the person’s anger, as Rashi explains. Since the act is considered constructive rather than destructive, he is liable for Kore’a.
The Gemara then challenges this explanation:
But is this permitted? … One who tears his clothing in anger, one who breaks his utensils in anger, or one who scatters his money in anger… let him be regarded in your eyes as though he were an idolater. For this is the craft of the evil inclination: today it tells him, “Do this,” tomorrow it tells him, “Do that,” until eventually it tells him, “Worship idols,” and he goes and worships idols.
R’ Avin then cites the source for this teaching: “There shall be no strange god among you, and you shall not bow down to a foreign god.’ (Tehilim 81:10). Who is the ‘strange god’ that exists within a person? It is the evil inclination.”
The Gemara resolves the contradiction by explaining that the Beraisa refers to a person who tears his clothing or breaks his utensils to instill fear in his family members; not simply to release his anger. He is deliberately displaying anger so that his family will take him seriously and correct their behavior. Doing so is permissible and is therefore regarded as Tikun, which is why he is liable for it on Shabbos.
However, simply seeking to assuage anger is not permitted; doing so is considered a pathway toward idolatry. The Yetzer haRa does not attempt to lead a person directly into a serious sin. It begins with something that may seem relatively minor, such as giving in to anger and destroying something. Once a person allows himself to be drawn down that path it gradually accustoms him to obeying its demands in more serious matters as well, until he may ultimately come to the point of worshipping idols.
However, we must clarify what the Gemara means by this initial submission to the Yetzer haRa. One possibility would be that it refers simply to giving in to anger and acting under its influence, since anger itself is considered a very serious sin, as the Rambam discusses in Hilchos De’os (2:3). In fact, in Hilchos Teshuva (7:3), the Rambam rules that a person must repent for the sin of anger.
However, this explanation is not entirely clear. The Gemara is discussing a person who is already angry, and, in fact, breaking objects in anger actually serves to relieve that anger.
The Maharsha (Chiddushei Aggados, Shabbos 105b) explains that the person’s submission to the Yetzer haRa consists in violating the prohibition of Bal Tashchis because of his anger. The Kesef Mishna (Hilchos Melachim 6:10) appears to explain the Gemara similarly, noting that this is the source from which the Rambam derives the prohibition of Bal Tashchis in the case of tearing a garment.
The Maharsha further explains that the Chachamim who would display their anger in order to instill fear in their households did so in a manner that did not involve Bal Tashchis. This is why R’ Acha bar Yaakov would break already-broken utensils. According to the Maharsha, the other examples cited by the Gemara were likewise performed in ways that did not involve destroying anything of value, or where the objects could subsequently be repaired. This Sefer haChinuch (Mitzva 529) records a similar explanation.
At first glance, according to the Maharsha, the Gemara could have answered that the person was tearing something to relieve his anger, but that he was doing so to an object of no value. Presumably, however, this was not a realistic scenario. In those times an intact object would not normally have been destined for the garbage, making it difficult to imagine an angry person deliberately searching for something worthless simply so that he could break it.
Moreover, tearing an already-torn garment or breaking an already-broken object would presumably be less effective as a means of relieving anger. The Gemara therefore gives a different answer: The Beraisa refers to someone who breaks something to make the members of his household take him seriously, and who deliberately acts in this manner. His family members presumably would not notice that the garment he was tearing was already torn, or that the object he was breaking was already broken; the display would therefore still be sufficiently intimidating to accomplish its purpose.
Nevertheless, the Maharsha’s approach, and the implication of the Kesef Mishna, establish that an object with no value is not subject to the prohibitions of Bal Tashchis or breaking utensils in anger.
Accordingly, although anger remains a serious prohibition even when no destruction is involved, a person who is already angry may take an action intended to calm himself, including breaking an object that has no value. Indeed, it may even be beneficial for him to do so if it helps him regain his composure. The prohibition lies specifically in expressing the anger through an impermissible act, such as destroying something of value.
Today, it is presumably much easier to find objects that have little or no value and that are destined to be thrown away anyway. Accordingly, as part of a therapeutic process, such objects could be used for this purpose.
Obviously, a person should ideally restrain his anger before it reaches the point where such actions become necessary. That is an independent obligation arising from the prohibition against anger itself. But once a person is already angry, there is no inherent problem with taking an action of this kind if it does not involve Bal Tashchis.[1]
Nevertheless, as I stated at the outset, it seems that even in a therapeutic setting, there is no basis for permitting a person to break utensils that have value. Though one might draw distinctions between the case discussed by the Gemara, which involves tearing something “in anger,” and someone who does so as part of a structured therapeutic program, or between someone whose immediate goal is simply to relieve his anger and someone who is undergoing broader psychological treatment, it does not seem correct to dismiss the explicit teaching of the Gemara based on theoretical distinctions. In fact, the Gemara itself indicates that the act does provide some immediate relief from anger, yet nevertheless maintains that it constitutes a destructive act in the longer term.
This latter point leads Rabbenu Chananel to raise an apparent difficulty: Even if the act is prohibited, it still provides a certain Tikun, since it calms the person down. If so, why should he not be liable for the act on Shabbos? The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 8:8 and 10:10), according to the interpretation of the Magid Mishna, takes a different approach to the passage precisely because of this difficulty.
The Mirkeves haMishna (Hilchos Shabbos 8:8) therefore explains that, according to Rashi, and apparently also according to Rabbenu Chananel’s answer, the Gemara’s question is not simply whether the act is halachically prohibited. Rather, it is demonstrating that since expressing anger in this way “is the craft of the evil inclination” it cannot constitute a genuine Tikun, even with regard to the person’s anger. For although he may feel calmer temporarily, he is actually arousing the Yetzer haRa and conditioning himself to submit to it. As the Mirkeves haMishna puts it: “Its destructive effect is greater than its corrective effect, because it cultivates the trait of anger.”
Thus, the fact that an action provides temporary emotional relief does not necessarily make it a genuine therapeutic Tikun. If the method itself reinforces a person’s tendency to give in to anger, its long-term effect may be destructive rather than constructive.[2]
The Gemara therefore establishes that this kind of destruction does not actually heal or resolve a person’s anger, and, consequently, it violates prohibitions. Accordingly, if the therapeutic instruction is, “Take an intact object and destroy it in order to release your anger,” it is very difficult to permit such a practice.
As for the second part of the question – the therapeutic expression of anger itself – there may actually be something positive about it. The Rambam (Hilchos De’os 6:6) rules that when someone has wronged another person, “he should not harbor resentment and remain silent, as it says regarding the wicked, ‘Avshalom said nothing to Amnon, neither good nor bad, for Avshalom hated Amnon.’ (Shmuel Beis 13:22). Rather, he is obligated to inform him and say to him: ‘Why did you do this to me? Why did you wrong me in this particular matter?’”
Our case is obviously different, since the person is not directly confronting the individual who harmed him. Nevertheless, the underlying principle is relevant: a person should not allow hatred and resentment to remain suppressed within him.
Cursing, however, is a very different matter. If the person who caused the harm is one’s father or mother, the prohibition is extremely serious. Cursing one’s parents is an offense carrying a capital punishment, and the Rambam (Hilchos Mamrim 5:12) rules that even if one’s parents are wicked and violate the Torah, it remains forbidden to curse them. (There is a dispute between the Shulchan Aruch and Rema in Yoreh De’ah 240:18 concerning the obligation to honor a wicked parent, but there is no permission to curse such a parent.)
It is likewise forbidden to curse any other Jew who is not wicked (Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:1). This applies even when the curse is spoken behind the person’s back and he has no knowledge that he was cursed, as discussed in haKlala li’Bracha by R’ Mordechai Gross (2:3:2).
There are various qualifications regarding a wicked person whom one may be permitted to curse. However, not every person who has caused someone harm is automatically considered a Rasha for this purpose. Furthermore, if the person has repented, it is forbidden to curse him (Yevamos 22b; Sanhedrin 85a). There is also a positive virtue – and an indication of good character – in refraining from cursing even a wicked person (haKlala li’Bracha, ibid., 5:4).
In addition, cursing can be dangerous for the person who utters the curse himself. A curse that is considered a Klalas Chinam, an unjustified curse, can ultimately return upon the one who uttered it (Sanhedrin 48b and Rashi there). See also Tochachas Chaim by R’ Chaim Palagi (1788-1868), Parshas Tetzaveh, where he discusses at length the serious nature of cursing. He explains that cursing is problematic from two perspectives: It accustoms a person to revenge and resentment, and there is a concern that the person being cursed may actually suffer harm. He further writes that the person who utters the curse, or even his descendants, may themselves be harmed as a result.
What about making a declaration beforehand that one does not want the curse to take effect?
In Tochachas Chaim, the author records a practice for someone who is concerned that he may curse another person: He can make a formal declaration in the presence of ten people that any curse that emerges from his mouth should be null and void.
At first glance, it appears that this is intended only as a safeguard and corrective measure for someone who has already failed or fears that he may fail, so that neither the person being cursed nor the person uttering the curse should suffer harm. It is not intended to provide a priori permission to utter curses.
This is also suggested by the requirement he mentions that the declaration be made in the presence of ten people. That requirement is not generally part of the laws governing such declarations, but is associated with situations in which one seeks the presence of the Shechina. This suggests that the purpose here is to remove or prevent the harmful effects of the curse, rather than to create a halachic permission to curse.
In any event, requiring ten people would presumably not be practical in the context of therapy. See also haKlala li’Bracha (2:7:3), which discusses the issue of making such a declaration. His discussion likewise suggests that, as a practical matter, there is no clear basis for relying on a declaration as a means of permitting a person to utter curses.
[Editor’s note: In practical terms, the analysis above yields the following conclusions:- An object of monetary value may not be broken, torn, or otherwise destroyed as a means of releasing anger, even for a legitimate therapeutic purpose; only an object that has no value, such as a broken or worn-out item that is going to be discarded, may be used for this purpose.
- Verbal expression of anger – for example, stating, “I’m angry” or “I was deeply hurt” – is permitted as part of processing anger that the person is still genuinely experiencing.
- Cursing another person, or expressing a wish for his death, remains forbidden regardless of the severity of the wrong done to him, especially where the wrongdoer is a parent, and a prior disclaimer does not lift this prohibition.
- A declaration made in advance before ten people nullifying one’s future curses, while discussed by the Poskim as a safeguard for someone who fears he may fail, does not provide a reliable halachic basis for permitting a therapeutic technique built around cursing.]
[1] Some Rishonim maintain that the objects broken by the Chachamim did have value, and that it was nevertheless permissible to destroy them because of the educational benefit. See Tosfos, Kiddushin 32a, s.v. “R’ Yehuda”; Sefer Yerei’im, Mitzva 382; and the Sma”g, Lo Sa’asei 229.
In any event, this does not contradict the principle above: The prohibition of breaking things in anger only applies when it constitutes Bal Tashchis.
It is also worth quoting the Sefer haChinuch cited above: “[the Chachamim] would present themselves as though they were angry.” In other words, they were not actually angry; they merely acted as though they were angry so that their families would heed them. Genuine anger, however, is prohibited.
[2] This also resolves the apparent difficulty of how tearing clothing in anger can constitute a violation of Bal Tashchis, when the Gemara (Shabbos 129a) teaches that a sick person may burn furniture for warmth when he has no firewood available. This demonstrates that destroying something for a legitimate purpose is permitted. We must say that in the case of anger there is no genuine Tikun.
Rabbi Yosef Sprung
